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PRIVACY TAKES A BACK SEAT: PUTTING
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION BACK ON
TRACK AFTER SEVERAL WRONG TURNS
CAROL A. CHASE*
Abstract: The automobile exception to the search warrant require-
ment originated in 1924, when obtaining a search warrant was a
lengthy and involved process. Today, federally and in a growing
number of states, search warrants can be obtained by telephone or
facsimile in a matter of minutes. Yet the automobile exception, origi-
nally based upon the exigency presented by the mobility of the auto-
mobile, remains intact and was recently extended to permit the war-
rantless search of property belonging to passengers in automobiles.
This article critically examines the development of the automobile ex-
ception and calls for a reform of that exception in light of changing
technology and procedural requirements.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: two women and a man are sitting on a
park bench chatting. A police officer approaches and notices a hypo-
dermic syringe in the man's shirt pocket. The officer asks the man
why he has a syringe and, with refreshing candor, the man replies that
he uses it to take drugs. With that, the officer asks the women to iden-
tify themselves. After they do so, the officer seizes a handbag that is
close to one of the women on the park bench and although the
woman claims it as her own, he proceeds to search the handbag, in-
cluding removing her wallet and identification. Under the current
law, this search would almost certainly violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. 1 Yet recently in Wyoming v. Houghton, the United States Su-
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the assistance of research assistants Daniel Montiel and Kirsten E. Seebart.
I See U.S. CoNs .r. amend. IV. While some circuit courts adopted an "automatic com-
panion" rule, permitting an automatic frisk of the companion of an arrestee, other courts
have rejected this rule. Compare United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973)
(per curiaim) and United States, Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971), with
United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d
495, 498 (Gth Gin 1985). Further, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a
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preme Court held that a similar search did not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment.2
 In the actual case, one critical fact differs from the sce-
nario described above. The owner of the handbag, Sandra Houghton,
was riding as a passenger in a can's
What is it about automobiles that has caused the Court to un-
dermine the protection afforded by the warrant requirement under
the Fourth Amendment? Is there any legitimacy to a rule which pro-
hibits the warrantless search of a handbag while its owner is standing
on a sidewalk but permits such a search once its owner becomes an
occupant of an automobile?
This article will consider the automobile. exception—the rule
which eliminates the need for a search warrant when there is prob-
able cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband or the
fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of criminal activity. 4 In Part I, the
article will examine how the seventy-five year old automobile excep-
tion, established by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v.
United States, has been expanded to apply to situations far beyond
those which originally justified the creation of the rule. Part II will
consider whether the automobile exception, as it has developed, can
be justified in light of the social and technological changes that have
occurred since the rule's conception. Finally, in Part III, the article
will consider an alternative to the present automobile exception that
would permit a limited seizure of the automobile pending the issu-
ance of a search warrant.
rule that would permit a frisk of a bar patron who happened to be present when a search
warrant was served on the bar. Seelbarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979). Furthermore,
the search of a companion's handbag, which included removing her wallet and
identification, along with a pouch and a second wallet, exceeds the scope of a "frisk,"
which is the cursory pat down of the suspect's outer clothing. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30-31 (1968) (where an officer has specific and articulable facts, the pat down of a sus-
pect's outer clothing for the purpose of locating weapons on the suspect's person was
justified). A search therefore must be justified by probable cause and a search warrant or
circumstances excusing the warrant requirement.
2 See 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1303 (1999).
3 See id. at 1299. Officers stopped an automobile for speeding and a faulty brake light.
See id. After ordering the occupants out of the vehicle and questioning the driver about a
syringe he saw in the driver's pocket, the police officer retrieved a handbag from the rear
seat of the car, which Ms. Houghton claimed was hers. See id. The officer searched the
handbag and found drugs and drug paraphernalia. See id.,
4 See, e.g., Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297; Belton v. United States, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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I, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
Two exceptions to the warrant requirement have grown up
around the automobile. This article will focus upon the broadest ex-
ception—the automobile exception—which is also referred to as the
Carroll doctrine. The Carroll doctrine permits a police officer to
search an entire motor vehicle and any containers inside it if there is
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or the
fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of criminal activity. The other
"automobile exception," articulated by the Court in New York v. Belton,
is an extension of the arrest power rule and is more limited in time
and scope than the Carroll .doctrine. 5 Belton permits the automatic
search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons, con-
traband or the fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of criminal activity
when an occupant of the vehicle has been arrested. 6 This section will
first consider the origin of the Carroll doctrine and will then trace the
expansion of that rule. Finally, this section will consider the Belton
rule and its development.
A. The Origin of the Carroll Doctrine
In 1924, the National Prohibition Act was in place to enforce the
now-repealed Eighteenth Amendment. 7 That Act made it "unlawful to
have or possess any liquor intended for use in violation of the Act"
and gave government officers the power to confiscate and destroy al-
coholic beverages.8 In the specifics of the case, the "Carroll boys" were
believed by the officers to be bootleggers in Grand Rapids, Michigan. 9
Officers had watched them traveling from Grand Rapids to Detroit
across an international boundary that was known as an artery for the
illegal importation of alcoholic beverages." Later, the same men were
observed driving back from Detroit to Grand Rapids." The officers,
suspecting that the automobile carried bottles of alcohol, stopped and
5 See 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
0 See id. at 460. The arrest power justifications for permitting a warrantless search—po-
lice officer safety and preventing destruction of evidence—differ from the considerations
that initially justified the automobile exception under Carroll v. United States. See infra Part
7 See U.S. CONST. zunend. XVIII (repealed 1933); National Prohibition Act, ch. 85,
§ 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) (vepealed 1933).
8 See National Prohibition Act § 7.
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searched the vehicle. 12 They discovered several bottles of whiskey hid-
den in the automobile's upholstery."
The United States Supreme Court justified the warrantless
search of the automobile based on two factors: probable cause existed
to believe that the vehicle contained contraband" and "it [was] not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle [could] be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant [was]
sought. "15 The Court expressly distinguished the search of a store,
residence or other fixed structure, for which obtaining a search war-
rant is practicable, from the search of moveable items such as cars,
boats and wagons, for which it is not practicable to obtain a search
warrant. 16
The Court's approval of an immediate warrantless search justified
by the automobile's mobility implicitly recognized an exigent circum-
stances exception to the warrant requirement. Carroll created a
bright-line rule that presumes exigency based upon the mobility of an
automobile (or other mobile vehicle) suspected to contain contra-
band or other evidence of criminal activity. 17 Thus, the original prem-
ise of Carroll's automobile exception was that a warrantless search is
reasonable and necessary because a search could be thwarted simply
by moving the automobile out of the "locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought." 18 The time needed to obtain a search
warrant in 1924, including travel time to and from the courthouse as
well as the time to complete the actual paperwork, obviously would
have permitted the vehicle to leave the jurisdiction. The alternative—
police immobilization of the vehicle for several hours or days—would
have violated the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreason-
able seizures without a warrant. 19 Thus, the Carroll doctrine—the first
recognized automobile exception—was born.
19 See id. at 172.
11 See id.
14
 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 159-62.





19 See Chambers v. Maloney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures).
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B. Developments after Carroll
As initially recogniied by the Court, the warrantless search of an
automobile based upon probable cause was justified entirely because
the mobility of the vehicle made it impracticable to secure a search
warrant." Several decades later, the automobile exception took a se-
ries of wrong turns as the Court expanded upon and ultimately ne-
glected the Carroll doctrine's rationale. In addition to citing the mo-
bility of automobiles, the Court now justifies the Carroll doctrine
based in part upon a reduced expectation of privacy afforded to peo-
ple and their possessions in automobiles. 21 In another wrong turn, the
Court rejected the idea that the courts should determine whether
one's possessory interest or one's privacy interest in an automobile is
more valuable.22 In a third wrong turn, the Court rejected a rule that
would only permit the seizure of containers in vehicles pending the
issuance of a search warrant, instead adopting a rule permitting the
warrantless search of containers within automobiles."
1. Reduced Expectation of Privacy: A Wrong Turn
While the Carroll decision principally justified its holding based
upon , the exigency created by the automobile's mobility, in the 1977
decision, United States v. Chadwick, the Supreme Court recognized a
second justification for the automobile exception: a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy. 24 Ironically, Chadwick did not involve the search
of a vehicle, but instead concerned the search of a footlocker that,
although seized from the trunk of an automobile, was not treated as
an automobile search. 25 Rather, the government unsuccessfully urged
the Court to extend Carroll's automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement to cover all movable property. 26
Recognizing that it had applied the automobile exception in
situations where the automobile, like the footlocker before it, was ef-
fectively immobilized by law enforcement officers, 27 the Court was
forced to develop a rationale justifying the warrantless search of an
20 See supra Part I.A.
21 See infix  Part I.13.1.
22
 See infra Part I.B.2.
23 See infra Part 1.13.3.
24 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,12-13 (1977).
25 See id. at 4,11.
" See id. at 11-12.
27 See id. at 12 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,441-42 (1973)).
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immobilized automobile which would distinguish such an immobi-
lized automobile from an immobilized footlocker. To do so, Chadwick
created the diminished expectation of privacy rationale as an addi-
tional justification for the automobile exception, thereby distinguish-
ing automobiles from other movable property. 28 It based this dimin-
ished expectation of privacy rationale on several considerations. First,
automobiles are operated on the open highway.29 Second, they must
be licensed, which encompasses tightly regulated operations." Third,
automobiles are periodically required to undergo official inspections
and are even taken into police custody "in the interests of public
safety."31
 The Court noted that none-of these factors, which reduce
the expectation of privacy that one has in an automobile, applies to
footlockers." Concluding that the owner of the footlocker has a
greater expectation of privacy in the contents of the footlocker than
an automobile owner has in the contents of his automobile, the Court
held that "[w]ith the footlocker safely immobilized, it was unreason-
able to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of a search
without a warrant.""
Perhaps the most perplexing irony of the Chadwick decision is
that in preserving one defendant's expectation of privacy in his foot-
locker, the Court articulated a new justification for automobile
searches that greatly diminished the Fourth Amendment protections
for anyone who rides in an automobile or places any property in an
automobile. The same outcome could have been reached without
compromising Fourth Amendment protections if the Chadwick Court
had recognized that the exigency of mobility upon which Carroll was
based ceases to exist once an object—even an automobile—has been
immobilized. Thus, while maintaining the Carroll doctrine as origi-
nally conceived, the Court could have clarified its purpose in a way
consistent with the maxim that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places."34 The wrong turn by the Chadwick majority placed
the automobile exception on a road which, along with other wrong
turns, has led to the warrantless search of property placed within an
28 See id.
29 See Chadwick, 443 U.S. at 12.




" See Chadwick, 443 U.S. at 13.
34 See id. at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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automobile—including Ms. Houghton's purse—merely because it
came to be located inside an automobile. 35
Chadwick's expansion of the justifications supporting the Carroll
doctrine is routinely invoked to legitimize warrantless searches of
immobilized vehicles. For example, California v. Carney reaffirmed the
reduced expectation of privacy justification for the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. 36 Carney stressed that "[e]ven in
cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser ex-
pectation of privacy ... justified application of the vehicular excep-
tion."37 The Carney Court clarified that the reduced expectation of
privacy derives not merely from the fact that the area searched is in
open view," which would eliminate searches of trunks or other closed
compartments, but also derives from "the pervasive regulation of ve-
hicles capable of traveling on public highways."" This pervasive regu-
lation places the public "on notice" that the vehicle may be stopped
and searched.° The fervor with which the Carney Court reaffirmed
the diminished expectation of privacy rationale is nothing short of
astonishing in light of the fact that the vehicle found to have this re-
duced expectation of privacy was a motor home!'"
The Carney majority deliberately chose to ignore a point made in
Justice Stevens' dissent: "[A] citizen has a much greater expectation of
privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home than of a piece of
luggage such as a footlocker."42 The real problem, it appears, is that
the Court has never adequately addressed how or why the mere fact
that a state regulates ownership and operation of vehicles, and may
require periodic inspection of certain mechanical components of the
vehicles, leads to the conclusion that people are abandoning or dra-
matically reducing their privacy interest in everything they place in-
side a vehicle. Why would Mr. Chadwick's expectation of privacy in his
footlocker, which was sufficiently great to require a warrant prior to a
55 See infra Part 11.13.3.
" See 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985).
37 See id. at 391; see also Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (holding "that
the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has
been immobilized"); United States v. Matthews, 32 F.3d 294, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1994) (up-
holding warrantless search of immobilized automobile based upon diminished expecta-
tion of privacy).
58 See 471 U.S. at 391.
59
 See id. at 392.
40
 See id.
41 See id. at 388, 393-94.
42 Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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search, be reduced merely because the footlocker was placed inside a
car? What is it about government regulation of automobiles that will
permit the warrantless inspection of undergarments or personal pa-
pers carried in the trunk? Is it reasonable to conclude, as the Carney
majority did, that people are sufficiently on notice that items placed
inside a car are no longer private enough to receive Fourth Amend-
ment protection?
2. Containers in Automobiles: Another Wrong Turn
After Chadwick, the Court was left with two rules that were bound
to collide. On one hand, the reduced expectation of privacy and mo-
bility of automobiles justifies the warrantless search of an automobile
if probable cause exists. On the other hand, an owner of mobile
property such as a footlocker has a sufficient expectation of privacy in
that property to require a police officer to obtain a warrant prior to
searching the property. Which rule will govern if Mr. Chadwick trans-
ports his luggage in au automobile?
For awhile, it appeared that the Court was heading down a road
destined to afford maximum Fourth Amendment protection to con-
tainers in vehicles. Arkansas v. Sanders faced the question that Chadwick
had sidestepped: whether the police may conduct a warrantless search
of a piece of luggage found inside the trunk of the vehicle, if they
have probable cause to search the vehicle. 45 The Sanders Court held
that the police could seize the luggage but could not open it without a
search warrant.'" The Court reaffirmed this holding two years later in
Robbins v. California which condemned the warrantless search of two
wrapped packages discovered in the luggage compartnient during a
vehicle search.45 Robbins expanded the type of containers that would
be recognized as private under the Fourth Amendment, noting that
43 See 442 U.S. 753,766. As in Chadwick, the police in Sanders had developed probable
cause to search the suitcase before the suitcase was placed into the trunk of a taxi. Compare
Sanders, 492 U.S.,at 755 (police had probable cause to believe suitcase which was placed in
trunk of taxi contained marijuana), with Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3-4 (federal agents had
probable cause to believe footlocker contained illegal drugs). But, unlike Chadwick, the
government in Sanders sought to justify the search under the automobile exception. Com-
pare Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762-63 (government justified search under automobile excep-
tion), with Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 (prosecutor did not contend that the footlocker's "brief
contact with the automobile's trunk" allowed a search under the automobile exception
doctrine, instead arguing that the luggage itself was "mobile" and therefore, analogous to
a search of an automobile).
44 See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766.
45 See 453 U.S. 420,428-29 (1981).
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"[w] hat one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a
paper bag."46
It was not long, however, before the Court made another wrong
turn with the automobile exception. One year after the Robbins deci-
sion, the Court backpeddled. In United States v. Ross, the Court ap-
proved the immediate warrantless search of a paper bag during the
warrantless search of an automobile. 47 In so holding, the Court cited
to Carroll, in which the whiskey found in the course of the prohibition
officer's search was not carried openly in the car, but was completely
hidden within the upholstery of the rumble seat.` The Court rea-
soned that Carroll would be severely undercut if police officers could
not search containers inside vehicles because contraband goods are
rarely placed in open view inside a vehicle.° Instead, contraband is
usually enclosed in some type of container." The Ross Court expressly
refused to reconsider or to overrule Sanders." Rather, it attempted to
draw fine distinctions between situations in which officers have prob-
able cause to believe an automobile contains contraband—which
permit the warrantless search of the entire automobile and any con-
tainers found therein52—and those in which officers have probable
cause to believe a particular container within an automobile contains
contraband—which permit the seizure, but not the search, of the con-
tainer." This distinction drew much criticism from the dissenters. Jus-
tice Marshall pointed out that, under the anomaly created by Ross and
Sanders, if an officer has probable cause to believe contraband is in a
bag in a car, Sanders controls and a search warrant is required to
search the bag. If an officer, however, has probable cause to believe
that a car contains contraband, but cannot localize it in a container,
Ross controls and the officer can search any container inside the car
in which the object of his search may be found. 54 The anomalous re-
sult is that the less precise the officer's information, the more thor-
ough and intrusive a search he is permitted to conduct. For example,
an officer who has probable cause to believe there is heroin some-
where in an automobile, but does not know where, may search the
46 See id. at 926.
47 See 456 U.S. 798,801,829-25 (1985).
48 See id. at 804.
49 See id. at 820.
5° See id.
51 See id. at 824.
" See Ross, 956 U.S. at 820-22.
" See id. at 824 (reaffirming the holding in Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)).
54 See id. at 839-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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entire vehicle and all containers therein. If the same officer has prob-
able cause to believe the heroin is in a brown suitcase in the car's
trunk, the officer can locate the luggage in the trunk and seize it.
Under Sanders, however, the officer cannot search the luggage without
a warrant.
The Supreme Court completed this wrong turn for the automo-
bile exception a decade later in California v. Acevado when it addressed
the anomaly created by Ross and Sanders. 55 In overruling Sanders, the
Court attempted to create one clear rule to be followed in all searches
under the automobile exception.56
 Justice Blackmun wrote for the
majority:
Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the
search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a con-
tainer and the search of a container that coincidentally turns
up in an automobile. The protections of the Fourth
Amendment must not turn on such coincidences. We there-
fore interpret Carroll as providing one rule to govern all
automobile searches. The police may search an automobile
and the containers within it where they have probable cause
to believe contraband or evidence is contained. 57
In reaching its conclusion, the Acevado Court relies on some question-
able reasoning. For example, quoting the Sanders dissent, the majority
notes that where the police have probable cause to seize the property,
"we can assume that a warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the
overwhelming majority of cases."58
 Yet, the Court has repeatedly re-
jected arguments that a warrantless search may be deemed lawful as
long as a court is convinced that a warrant, if it had been sought,
would likely have been issued.° As additional support for its holding,
the Acevado majority notes that the search of containers in automo-
biles may often be justified under a different theory, such as search
incident to arrest.60
 It is not logical to argue that just because a search
55 See generally 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
56 See id. at 580.
57 Id.
58
 See id. at 575 (quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 770 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
" See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 356 (refusing to validate a wmTantless search which would
have been within the scope of a search that could have been authorized by a judicial
officer); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (invalidating warrantless search
of apartment where officers had evidence based upon which a magistrate would likely have
issued a search wart-ant).
50 See Acevado, 500 U.S. at 575-76.
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sometimes fits within one exception to the warrant requirement, the
limitations that exist with respect to a different exception should be
abrogated, especially where the two exceptions are not completely
coextensive. The Acevado Court's use of the arrest power exception to
the warrant requirement as a reason to extend the Carroll doctrine to
permit the opening of a container clearly expands the law if the con-
tainer is found in an area other than the passenger compartment
where the arrest power rule does not apply.61 This reasoning also as-
sumes the correctness of the arrest power rule as applied to all con-
tainers found in cars, something that this article will explore later. 62
In fact, the Acevado Court's attempt to resolve an anomaly merely
shifted the anomaly. Currently, all containers in an automobile are
subject to one rule—no warrant is needed to search them—but con-
tainers not found in an automobile are subject to a different rule.° A
container in a home, or even on a public sidewalk, is subject to the
Chadwick rule requiring a warrant prior to searching the container. 64
Under Acevado, however, a container in a car may be opened without
a warrant whenever there is probable cause to search the car in which
the container is found as long as the container may contain the object
of the search.65 Yet, there is little reason to justify diminishing Mr.
Chadwick's expectation of privacy in his footlocker merely because he
places it in the trunk of a can If anything, Once a footlocker is con-
cealed within the trunk of an automobile, it seems that its owner has
made a greater effort to maintain his/her privacy interest than the
owner who has placed his/her footlocker on a sidewalk.
3. The Court's Difficulty in Expressly Recognizing that Privacy May
Require Greater Protection than Possession: A Third Wrong Turn
It is clear that the Fourth Amendment protects three individual
rights.66 First, it protects the right to privacy, which may be intruded
upon by a search. Second, it protects the rights to possess and to use
61 See id.
62 See infra Part 11.C.
63 Compare Acevado, 500 U.S. at 580 (police may conduct warrantless search of any con-
tainer in a car if supported by probable cause), with Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11, 13 (contain-
ers not found during the search of an automobile require a warrant before a search may
be conducted).
64 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11, 13.
65 See Acevado, 500 U.S. at 580.
66 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV rile right of the people to be secure in their persons,
house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated
....") (emphasis added).
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one's property, which may be intruded upon by a seizure of that
property. Third, it protects the right to be free to go where one likes,
which may be intruded upon by the seizure of the individual. What is
not clear, however, is whether the right to be protected from unrea-
sonable searches and the right to be protected against unreasonable
seizures are rights of equal value. Recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects both privacy interests and possessory interests, is
there any basis to conclude that one interest is entitled to more
weight than the other? If a person's possessory interest is less valuable
than his privacy interest, it would make sense to adopt a rule which
permits a limited seizure—an infringement of the possessory inter-
est—in order to protect the more valuable privacy interest.
A common sense argument can be made. that the privacy interest
is the one more worthy of protection. If one is deprived of the use of
an automobile or the freedom to drive in the automobile, one is in-
convenienced. A prolonged seizure results in greater inconvenience; a
brief seizure, however, may involve only slight—or even no—incon-
venience. What the individual has lost during the duration of the sei-
zure is the right to freely use, enjoy or occupy the automobile. The
seizure alone does not reveal any private fact about the individual be-
yond that which is openly visible. When the seizure ends, the individ-
ual fully regains the right to use, enjoy and occupy the automobile.
A search, by contrast, is more than merely inconvenient—it per-
manently destroys the individual's privacy interest in the thing
searched. Depending upon what items an individual carries in his car,
a search of the car may inform officers of the identity of the individ-
ual's associates, the type of activities the individual enjoys, the type of
literature the individual reads, the type and size of undergarments the
individual wears and other private—perhaps embarrassing—informa-
tion. The search may be brief in duration, but the information re-
vealed cannot be unrevealed. The individual's privacy interest in the
items searched is irretrievably lost.
There are myriad decisions by the United States Supreme Court
and lower courts implicitly recognizing that the interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment are not of equal value and that the privacy
interest outweighs the possessory or freedom interest. 67
 Chadwick im-
plicitly recognized this when it refused to permit the search of a foot-
locker seized by the police absent a warrant, despite the fact that the
67 See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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time required to secure the search warrant would necessarily prolong
the seizure of the footlocker.°
In Segura v. United States, the Court approved the use of evidence
uncovered during the search of an apartment pursuant to a warrant. 69
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, police entered the apartment to
secure it, seizing the apartment during the pendency of the warrant's
arrival." Though the entry into the apartment was assumed to be an
illegal "search," the evidence obtained through the illegal "search"
was not offered at trial." The evidence offered at trial was uncovered
and seized during a search pursuant to a warrant." The fact that the
apartment was initially seized without a warrant (as opposed to
searched) did not invalidate the subsequent search pursuant to a valid
warrant. The Court's implicit acceptance of a procedure by which po-
lice temporarily seize a premises to maintain the status quo pending
the arrival of a search warrant implicitly recognizes that the violation
of the individual's possessory interest in his home is reasonable be-
cause it is a less intrusive violation than the violation of his privacy in-
terest." Numerous lower courts have approved the seizure of a prem-
ises or item of property pending the issuance of a search warrant. 74
Each of these decisions clearly demonstrates a willingness to protect a
privacy interest even at the expense of intrusion upon a possessory
interest.
Perhaps the boldest recognition that privacy is a weightier inter-
est under the Fourth Amendment than possession—or even free-
dom—is evident when one considers how the courts have applied the
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Arguably the seizure of an
68 See 433 U.S. at 13.
69 See 468 U.S. 796, 799 (1984).
70 See id. at 800.
71 See id. at 798, 801-03.
72 See id. at 803.
73 The occupants of the apartment in Segura had been arrested and taken into custody.
See 468 U.S. at 800, 801. Thus, it may be argued that they had no opportunity to exercise
their possessory interest in the apartment. Other courts also have approved seizures pend-
ing warrants. See United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 485-86 (9th Cir. 1989) ("So long
as the 'seizure' of the premises was supported by probable cause, and not otherwise unrea-
sonable, items subsequently seized under the valid warrant are not directly excludable.");
United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1985) (approving seizure of motorcy-
cle shop pending the issuance of a search warrant).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 38 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding the
warrantless seizure of a camper pending the issuance of search warrant); Rodriguez, 869
F.2d at 486 (approving seizure of residence from mid-afternoon to mid-evening pending
issuance of a warrant); I'eillettc, 778 F.2d at 903 (approving the seizure of a shop pending
the issuance of a search warrant despite an illegal entry).
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individual—the custodial arrest—is the most extreme intrusion upon
one's Fourth Amendment interests. A custodial arrest deprives an in-
dividual of freedom as well as the ability to use and enjoy his property
and possessions. Yet, the Supreme Court has made it clear that custo-
dial arrests for felony offenses are valid under the Fourth Amendment
without a warrant as long as the arrest is supported by probable
cause. 75
 Additionally, contraband or fruits, instrumentalities and evi-
dence of criminal activity that are in plain view may be seized without
a warrant. 78
 Where a search is required, however, to uncover a seizable
object, the Court has concluded that a warrant is needed, subject only
to a "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 77 In
holding that searches without prior approval by a judge or magistrate
are per se unreasonable,, the Court focused upon the need to protect
individual privacy interests by interposing the deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer between the citizen and the police. 78 By
mandating a warrant for searches while not requiring a warrant for
seizures—even custodial arrests—which do not require searches, the
Court implicitly recognized that a search involves a greater intrusion
into protected rights than a seizure, an intrusion so great as to require
neutral judicial intervention unless excused by exceptional circum-
stances. 79
In light of the foregoing, the third wrong turn by the Supreme
Court occurred in Chambers v. Maroney.80
 In May of 1 963,  following the
robbery of a service station, two men fitting the description of the
robbers were arrested and the automobile in which they were riding
was taken into custody.81
 Later, the car was searched without a warrant
and evidence related to the robbery and other robberies was found.82
The petitioner in Chambers challenged the lawfulness of the war-
rantless search under the automobile exception because the exigency
provided by the mobility of the automobile was effectively eliminated
when the car was taken into police custody." The petitioner con-
tended that a warrant should have been obtained prior to searching
75 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
76 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130-31, 142 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
77 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13; Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 357.
78 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356, see also Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
79 See supra notes 68-78 and accompaming text.
80 See generally 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
81 See id. at 44.
82 See id.
85
 See id. at 52.
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the automobile. 84 Justice White, writing for the majority, made short
work of that argument, writing:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judg-
ment, only the immobilization of the car should be permit-
ted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the
"lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate author-
izes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which is the
"lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question and the an-
swer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitu-
tional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the prob-
able cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carry-
ing out an immediate search without a warrant. 85
The difficulty Justice White had in determining which is the greater
interest—privacy or possession—is particularly improbable in light of
the fact that, at the time the warrantless search was conducted, the
vehicle's occupants were in police custody. As the occupants were not
in a position to be able to enjoy their possessory interest in the car,
there can be no doubt as to which interest was more valuable to these
individuals. Furthermore, the development of the law up to that point
made it clear that courts gave heightened protection to the individ-
ual's privacy interest, a sign that the law recognizes that interest to be
the greater interest. The Chambers ruling is clearly wrong in light of
the body of law preceding and following it.
C. The "Other" Automobile Exception: New York v. Belton
Although this article is principally concerned with problems that
arose as a result of the development of the Carroll doctrine, mention
should be made of the other exception to the warrant requirement
that has been applied in the context of automobiles—the bright-line
arrest power rule articulated by the Supreme Court in New York v.
 Bel-
ton.86 The Belton opinion attempted to create an easy-to-follow applica-
tion of the rule articulated by the Court in Chimel v. California permit-
ting a limited warrantless search incident to arrest. 87 In Chimel, the
Court recognized that custodial arrest creates a situation which
84 See id. at 47.
85 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52.
86 See grnei ally 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
87 See 395 U.S. 752,762-63 (1969).
86
	
Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 41:71
justifies an immediate warrantless search of the person arrested and
the "grab area" of that person. 88 The justification for this warrantless
search is twofold: first, concern for officer safety should the arrestee
have access to a weapon and second, concern about possible destruc-
tion of evidence within the arrestee's reach. 89
Belton attempted to define the scope of the grab area when the
arrestee is the occupant of an automobile. The Court established a
bright-line rule when the arrestee is an occupant of an automobile
that permits an automatic search incident to arrest of the entire pas-
senger area of an automobile, including all containers found inside
the passenger area. 99
 This rule, which has been heavily criticized,91
applies automatically whenever the occupant of an automobile is ar-
rested. It permits the search of containers even if they could not con-
tain weapons or evidence of the criminal conduct which caused the
suspect's arrest 92 While it is difficult to dispute that an arresting
officer is justified in immediately searching to preserve evidence and
to protect his own safety, there is less justification for permitting an
immediate warrantless search of containers that are beyond the wing-
span of the arrestee, although this is clearly permitted under Belton.
Particularly where, as in Houghton, an occupant of a vehicle identifies
a specific container as hers and there is no probable cause prior to
searching the container that would justify the arrest of the owner of
the container, arrest power justification for a search of that container
is very weak. In that situation, a better rule would be to permit the
officer to seize the container if there is probable cause to believe it
may contain contraband, but to require a warrant before permitting
the search of the container. This would contract the scope of the
search permitted presently under Belton. The limited seizure of the
container, however, would serve the protective functions of the arrest
power rule while maintaining some protection under the Fourth




 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
91 See generally Colleen Hancock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA.
L. Rev. 1085 (1982); Wayne R. 1AFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Draw-
ing Bright Lines and Good Faith, 43 U. Prrr. L. Rev. 307 (1982); Robert A. Stern, Comment,
Robbins v. California and New lbrk v. Belton: The Supreme Court Opens the Door to Container
Searches, 31 Am. U. L. REV. 291 (1982).
92 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461; accord United States v. Robinson, 4 l 4 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)
(approving search of a cigarette pack on the defendant's person following his arrest for
driving without a license).
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Amendment for those whose only crime may be that they are riding in
an automobile with someone who has engaged in criminal conduct.
II. A CALL FOR REFORMING THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
There are at least three compelling reasons to re-evaluate and
reform the automobile exception, each of which will be explored in
this section. First, the original justification for the automobile excep-
tion, as articulated in United States v. Car old—that the mobility of the
vehicle essentially forecloses the option of securing a warrant—has
lost much of its force in light of changing technologies. 93 Second, the
alternative justification for the automobile exception first articulated
in United States v. Chadwick—the reduced expectation of privacy ra-
tionale"—does not rationally support a search of containers and
closed compartments in automobiles. Finally, the development of the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits abusive law
enforcement practices which cry out for the narrowing of the excep-
tion.
A. The Mobility of an Automobile No Longer Presents an Exigent
Circumstance
As previously discussed, the justification underlying the Carroll
exception to the warrant requirement is the concern that automobiles
may be quickly removed from the locality in which the warrant is
sought, giving an officer insufficient opportunity to seek a warrant.
The opportunity to search is fleeting: it is now or never. In 1924, when
Carroll was decided, getting a search warrant meant driving to the lo-
cal judge or magistrate, writing out an affidavit in support of a war-
rant, obtaining a warrant and then returning to the location to per-
form the search. This process could be expected to take several hours
and may not have been capable of completion on the same day. Im-
mobilizing an automobile for several hours, or even days, may have
been a viable alternative in 1924, but it is not likely that it would have
been considered more reasonable than a warrantless search. Immobi-
lizing the vehicle pending the arrival of a search warrant effectively
seizes both the vehicle and its occupants. The Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. A prolonged sei-
93 See generally 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
94 See generally 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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zure of a vehicle and its occupants is a significant intrusion upon
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment."
Today, telephonic search warrants can be obtained both feder-
ally" and in a growing number of states. 97
 While this does not mean
that search warrants can be obtained instantaneously, it does elimi-
nate the travel time to obtain a warrant. Telephonic search warrants
often may be obtained in less than an hour."
The availability of telephonic search warrants and the fact that
cellular telephones and fax machines have become commonplace
should change the analysis under the Carroll doctrine as to which
course of action by a police officer is most reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. In Carroll, the alternative to an immediate search
of the vehicle would have been a prolonged seizure of the vehicle and
its occupants pending the arrival of a search warrant." Both alterna-
tives involved serious intrusions upon an individual's right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Faced with a scenario that
necessitates some intrusion into an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights—whether it is a search or a seizure—the proper course to fol-
low is the most reasonable (least intrusive) alternative.
Chambers v. Maroney implicitly recognizes that this is the approach
to be followed. The opinion notes that "because of the preference for
a magistrate's judgment ... arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is
permissible until the magistrate authorizes the greater."'" Although
96
 This is in contrast to the circumstances in Chambers where the vehicle had already
been seized and its owners were lawfully in custody. See 399 U.S. at 44, 51-52. In that cir-
cumstance, prolonging for a few bouts, or even days, the seizure of a vehicle is a much less
significant intrusion upon the rights of the individual because its occupants could not use
it regardless. See id.
96 See FED. R. CRIM. P. § 41(c) (2) .
97 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-183 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.010 (b) (1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914 (c) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1526 (b) (West 1997); Karl.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2502 (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.651 (West 1982); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-814.03 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.045 (2) (1997); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. L.
§ 690.36 (McKinney 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-35-5 (1998); UTAH Cone
ANN. § 77-23-204(2) (1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.12 (3) (West 1998).
" See United States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that even a
telephonic search warrant takes at least one half hour); United States v. Baker, 520 F. Stipp.
1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (telephonic search warrants are obtainable in 20 to 30 min-
utes).
" As the Carroll decision recognized, the mobility of the vehicle made seeking a war-
rant "impracticable." See 267 U.S. at 153. The only practicable alternative to the immediate
search would have been to immobilize the vehicle and its occupants until the search war-
rant had been secured.
190 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.
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the Chambers Court had difficulty in determining which is the
"greater" and which is the "lesser" intrusion, the approach taken by
the Court—attempting to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement by
taking the least intrusive of two alternatives—is a sound one. 101 In-
deed, if the Fourth Amendment guarantees are to have any meaning,
reason and common sense dictate that where a situation requires
some immediate action that intrudes upon an interest protected
thereunder, the only "reasonable" course is to choose the least intru-
sive alternative.
In light of the technological advances which now permit law en-
forcement officers to obtain search warrants in a matter of minutes,
rather than the hours or days required at the time Carroll was decided,
we face a very different set of alternatives than those faced by the
Carroll Court. Officers may briefly immobilize a vehicle pending the
issuance of a warrant or they may rely upon the Carroll decision and
search immediately without a warrant. Undeniably, the brief seizure of
the automobile and its occupants is an intrusion upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of its occupants, but the brevity of the immobiliza-
tion—which often will not require more than an hour—reduces the
seriousness of this intrusion. 102 The alternative—an immediate search
of the car—irreparably destroys the occupants' privacy interests in the
automobile and the containers inside. There can be no serious debate
as to which is the greater and which is the lesser intrusion, Chambers
notwithstanding. The rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are
more faithfully observed when Only the lesser intrusion—the brief
seizure—is permitted unless and until a judicial officer authorizes the
greater intrusion: a search pursuant to a search warrant issued after a
judicial officer concurs that there is probable cause to search.
B. The "Reduced Expectation of Privacy" Rationale Does Not Justify
Warrantless Searrhes of the Entire Automobile and All
Containers Therein
For more than fifty years, the sole justification for the automobile
exception was the exigency presented by mobility first recognized in
Carroll. As previously noted, however, Chadwick articulated a second
justification: people have a diminished expectation of privacy in their
1o1 See supra Part 1.13.3.
102 See Morgan, 744 F.2d at 1222 (noting that even a telephonic search warrant takes at
least one half hour); People v. Aguirre, 26 Cal. App. 3d Stipp. 7, 11 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1972) (telephonic search warrant issued in 12 minutes).
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automobiles. 103
 Although the Court's reasoning is not entirely clear, it
appears that this diminished expectation of privacy affects Fourth
Amendment analysis by lessening the gravity of an intrusion upon the
individual's privacy interests in an automobile; if a search does not
compromise a highly private interest, it is easier to find that a warrant-
less search is "reasonable" under the circumstances. 104
 If one has a
minimal expectation of privacy in an automobile, a search of that
automobile does not intrude greatly on one's Fourth Amendment
rights. Therefore, the search may actually be an intrusion of lesser
magnitude than a seizure would be, making it reasonable to proceed
with a warrantless search.
This reasoning contains several flaws. The Chadwick Court based
its conclusion that automobiles bear a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy on several factors. First, automobiles are operated on the open
highway.105
 While this factor may justify recognizing a diminished pri-
vacy interest in areas exposed to public view, such as the interior of
the passenger area that can be viewed through a window, it is difficult
to see how the mere operation of an automobile on a public highway
serves to reduce the operator's expectation of privacy in the trunk,
glove box or other containers which are not exposed to public view.
Chadwick also bases its diminished expectation of privacy rationale on
the fact that automobiles must be licensed, their operation is tightly
regulated, they are required to undergo periodic inspection and they
may be taken into police custody for safety reasons. 106 Yet, none of
these justifications supports logically Chadwick's conclusion that there
is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile's interior com-
partments or in containers carried within. The procedure for obtain-
ing a license for an automobile consists of registering it to an owner
and paying a fee. 107
 This act does not cause or require any loss of pri-
vacy in the contents of the automobile. Indeed, most jurisdictions
103 See infra part I.B.1.
104 Cf. Veronia School District 475 v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646, 654-60 (1995) (considering
the nature of the privacy interest as well as the character of the intrusion to determine the
reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment); South Dakota v. Opperinan,
428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) (less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expec-
tation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office").
105
 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
1°6 See id.
107 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. Conti § 4150 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.23 (West Stipp.
2000); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 401 (111cKinney 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.12.040
(West Stipp. 2000).
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have myriad laws regulating aspects of residential property. 1°8 Yet, it
cannot be seriously urged that these regulations reduce the expecta-
tion of privacy in a person's home. Indeed, despite these require-
ments, one's home remains the most protected of all private areas
under the Fourth Amendment.lw States also regulate who can oper-
ate automobiles and have created motor vehicle codes to govern the
operation of automobiles.no Again, it is quite a stretch to argue that
merely because states set qualifications for drivers, speed limits and
the like, an occupant of an automobile has a diminished expectation
of privacy in the contents of the trunk—or a closed container within
the trunk.
Perhaps the strongest support for the diminished expectation of
privacy afforded to automobiles is the fact that cars are periodically
required to undergo official inspections. The official inspections,
however, are not wholesale searches of the automobiles and contain-
ers within for evidence of criminal activity. Rather, they are inspec-
tions narrowly tailored to serve a non-law enforcement purpose, such
as inspections to determine the functioning of automobile emissions
equipmentm or safety-related inspections. 112 These inspections are
aimed at the mechanical functioning of the automobile and are
highly unlikely to require an official inspection of luggage areas, glove
compartments or containers in the automobile. Therefore, it is not
logical to contend that the mere existence Of the government's
authority to conduct or require automobile inspections reduces one's
expectation of privacy in those areas. Further, most of those inspec-
1 °8 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Cone § 13113.8 (West Stipp. 1999) (requiring
smoke detectors in single family homes); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 389—m, o (McKinney 1999)
(requiring safety glass in residential housing); WASH. REV. Cone ANN. § 48.48.140 (West
1999) (requiring smoke detectors in all dwellings).
109 The Fourth Amendment pays specific attention to the right of the people to be se-
cure in their houses. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (*The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ... .") (emphasis supplied); see also United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359,
1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding a clog sniff outside an apartment constituted an illegal
search because of the heightened expectation of privacy in one's home).
11° See, e.g., CAL. VEH. Cone § 12800 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.03 (West
1995); N.Y. VEILS,: TitAr. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.161
(West Supp. 2000).
111 See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44011 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 325.207 (West 1999); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 301 (McKinney 1999); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 46.16.015 (West Supp. 2000).
112 See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 2814 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 325.203 (West
Supp. 1999); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. 'LAW § 375 (McKinney 1996); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN.
§ 46.64.070 (West Supp. 2000).
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Lions are performed by mechanics selected by the owner at a time of
the owner's choosing,115
 a factor which further undercuts the• argu-
ment that the official inspection of automobiles diminishes one's ex-
pectation of privacy so as to permit thorough police searches of the
automobile and all containers within.
Finally, Chadwick lists the fact that cars may be taken into custody
"in the interest of public safety" as a justification for reducing one's
expectation of privacy in an automobile)" The problem with this rea-
soning is that it could apply to virtually all movable property. Indeed,
it is sometimes necessary for government agents to secure and inspect
even residential property for reasons of public safety, as in the imme-
diate aftermath of a fire or an earthquake." 8 The possibility that this
might occur is hardly sufficient to diminish one's expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile, suitcase or home.
The flaws in the "reduced expectation of privacy" justification are
even more apparent when one examines both Chadwick and
Acevado. 116
 The former decision stressed the distinction between a
footlocker, in which the owner maintained his full expectation of pri-
vacy, and an automobile, in which the occupant has a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy. 117
 The Court stated:
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an auto-
mobile do not apply to respondent's footlocker. Luggage
contents are not open to public view, except as a condition
to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage
subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a con-
tinuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function
is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of per-
sonal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in
personal luggage are substantially greater than in an auto-
mobile. 118
Yet Acevedo, which permits law enforcement officials to open all con-
tainers found in an automobile being searched without a warrant,
113
 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44011.3 (West Stipp. 1999).
114 See 433 U.S. at 13.
113 See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
509-10, 511-12 (1978); United States v. Pan', 716 F.2d 796, 812-13 (11th Cir. 1983). But see
United States V. Urban, 710 F.2d 276, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1983).
116
 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991); Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
117 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
118 Id.
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completely ignores this distinction. 119 Why should a person's privacy
interest in his personal luggage be diminished by the mere fact that
the luggage was placed inside an automobile? Chadwick, which
specifically held unreasonable the warrantless search of an immobi-
lized container,'" is directly at odds with Acevado, which specifically
permits the warrantless search of all containers found in an automo-
bile. 121 In United States v. Ross the Court attempted to sidestep this
anomaly by urging that it would be wasteful to permit police to search
the entire car until they discovered a container but then make them
wait for permission from a magistrate to search the container. 122 Yet,
whether the container is found in an automobile or on a sidewalk be-
side an automobile should not be a constitutionally significant factor.
A far better result would have been achieved had the court adopted
one rule: automobiles and movable containers (in or out of vehicles)
can be briefly seized to permit the obtaining of a search warrant but
can only be searched without consent upon the issuance of a valid
search warrant.
C. The Automobile Exception Has Fostered Abusive Police Practices
On a rainy day in May 1992, Robert Wilkins, an African American
public defender, and his family were driving a rental car outside
Washington, D.C. as they returned home from a family funeral in
Chicago. Maryland State Police officers pulled over Mr. Wilkins' car.
They ordered the family out of the car and made them stand in the
rain while they ran drug sniffing dogs through the car—over Wilkins'
repeated objections. 123 In June of 1998, Curtis Rodriguez, also an at-
torney, had a similar experience in California. After photographing
police stops of Latino men, Mr. Rodriguez, who was driving with fel-
low attorney Arturo . Hernandez, was stopped by California Highway
Patrol Officers. After an officer informed Mr. Rodriguez that he
wanted to search his car, Mr. Rodriguez identified himself and his
companion as lawyers and told the officers that he did not consent to
the search, saying, "If you want to search the car, get a warrant." The
officer ordered the men out of the car and searched , the vehicle,
finding nothing. 124 In both of these incidents, it appeared that the
119 See 500 U.S. at 579.
120 See 433 U.S. at 515-16.
121 See 500 U.S. at 579.
In See 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982).
123 See Gary Webb, D11B, EsquIRE MAC., Apr. 1999, at 120, 126 [bet einafter DIVB].
124 See id. at 120.
94
	
Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 41:71
primary motivation for the stop and search was the ethnic back-
ground of the automobile's occupants. 125 It is difficult to know pre-
cisely how frequently similar scenarios are played out across the na-
tion. Those who are subjected to similar searches and are found to
have contraband may face criminal charges and then may challenge
the search by bringing a motion to suppress the evidence at trial. But,
because the exclusionary rule remains the primary remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations, 126
 for those victims of Fourth Amendment
rights violations like Mr. Wilkins and Mr. Rodriguez, against whom no
criminal charges are filed, there are no readily obtainable remedies to
deter the violations. 127
Abusive police practices targeting minority groups are occasion-
ally reported, but it is likely that they are underreported. 128
 We do
know that such practices occur frequently enough that the "offense"
which drew attention to Mr. Wilkins and Mr. Rodriguez is widely
known as "DWB"—"driving while black" or "driving while brown." 129
There is no shortage of incidents in which a stop was made based, at
least to some degree, upon racial profiling.m
The danger posed by the manner in which the automobile ex-
ception has developed is that it permits the police to search an auto-
mobile merely because the persons targeted by the police—including
those targeted because of their race or for other improper reasons—
are in an automobile. While the police are required to have probable
cause to believe the automobile contains contraband to lawfully con-
duct the search, the very fact that no neutral and detached magistrate
must first pass upon whether probable cause exists opens the door to
abuse. Where the search of an automobile turns up nothing, the vic-
tims of the search rarely bother to complain. Indeed, the only truly
unusual aspect of Mr. Wilkins' case is that, as an attorney, he had the
motivation and the resources to file a civil rights action against the
Maryland State Police. 131
 For most other victims, especially those at
I" See id. at 122.
/26 See Perrin et al., If In Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule—A New and
Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to
Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 736-40 (1998).
127 See
128 See, e.g., Robyn Meredith, Near Detroit, a Familiar Sting in Being a Black Driven L.A.
Tams, July 16, 1999, at 28; Jan Cobb, Probable Cause, L.A. MAG., Aug. 1999, at 74.
129 See DIIB, supra note 123, at 122.
130
 See ki.
131 See id. at 126. Part of the settlement of that lawsuit required the police to maintain
records of their stops over a three year period. Those records revealed that, of the 732
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the lower end of the economic spectrum, it is too expensive and too
time consuming to proceed in court. Moreover, the victims may not
even be aware that their rights have been violated. Lack of access to
legal assistance and low likelihood of success on the merits remain
insurmountable obstacles for the average person.' 52 Thus, these abu-
sive police practices continue undeterred.
Even those individuals who are charged with a crime face sub-
stantial obstacles when they challenge the legality of an automobile
search that has yielded incriminating evidence. Under the current
law, evidence is lawfully seized as long as there was probable cause to
search the automobile before the search. The problem presented is
that by the time the police testify at a suppression hearing, the search
is over and contraband or evidence has been discovered. It is well-
known that some police officers offer perjured—or exaggerated—tes-
timony to legitimize an otherwise unlawful search.'" Others, who
honestly strive to give truthful testimony, will have their testimony
colored by what was found during the search. When police find con-
traband, judges are more likely to believe that probable cause to
search existed prior to the search. Thus, even a search that may have
been conducted in the absence of probable cause may not be recog-
nized at a suppression hearing as having lacked probable cause in
light of subsequent events.
What the foregoing illustrates is that, under the current state of
the law, there is little to discourage an officer from engaging in abu-
sive automobile searches. If, however, the rule were modified to re-
quire a neutral magistrate to pass upon the existence of probable
cause, the number of abusive automobile searches would likely de-
cline. Fewer officers would feel free to stop drivers merely because of
their race, their youth or their attitudes if the officers will then be re-
quired to telephone a magistrate to confirm the existence of probable
cause prior to the search. Those who are stopped and are about to
have their automobiles searched would have the full protection of the
Fourth Amendment, a protection which the United States Supreme
Court has stated "consists in requiring that those inferences [support-
people stopped in the anti-drug Operation Pipeline, 75% were black and 5% were His-
panic. See id.
132 See Perrin et al., supra note 126, at 738.
123 See Myron W. Orfield,k, Deterrence, Pojury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionaly Rule
in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 Coro. L. REV. 75,85-88 (1992). In the case of Curtis Rod-
riguez, prior to searching the car the officer said in a monotone "I'm in fear for my life" as
a justification for the search. See DIM, supra note 123, at 120.
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ing probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competi-
tive enterprise of ferreting out critne.'" 4
III. PUTTING THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION BACK ON TRACK
The Fourth Amendment presents a tension between two compet-
ing interests: the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable
government searches and seizures and the need to effectively dis-
cover, punish and deter those engaged in criminal activity. Thus, the
right to be free from government searches and seizures is not abso-
lute; the Fourth Amendment simply guarantees that we will be free
from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The Court has read the
Fourth Amendment in a way which presumes that warrantless searches
and seizures are unreasonable,"5 at least in the context of criminal
cases. 136
 Although one scholar has noted that there are nearly twenty
exceptions that have developed to this warrant "requirement,"137 and
at least one sitting United States Supreme Court justice has supported
eliminating the general rule making a warrant indispensable to
finding a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 138 there
can be little doubt that the individual's Fourth Amendment rights are
better protected where the existence of probable cause to search or
seize has been reviewed and passed upon by a judicial officer. The
Court has noted:
"4
 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) ("Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained
by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers
while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.").
155 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
138 The Court has invoked the reasonableness clause, rather than the warrant clause,
when the government's search or seizure serves "special needs" beyond mere criminal law
enforcement. SeeVeronia School District 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). The court
stated:
Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness gener-
ally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.... A search unsupported by
[a warrant and] probable cause can be constitutional, we have said, "when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the war-
rant mid probable-cause requirement impracticable."
Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
137 See T. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74
(1985).
153 See California v Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) (Scalia, j., concurring).
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[the absence of this judicial pre-review] bypasses the safe-
guards provided by an objective predetermination of prob-
able cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable pro-
cedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search,
too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcom-
ings of hindsight judgment.'"
There is great value in having a neutral judicial officer review the
facts known to a police officer and determine whether probable cause
exists to search a place or thing. In order to safeguard our Fourth
Amendment rights, the warrant requirement must not be dispensed
with lightly. In United States v. Carroll, the Court implicitly recognized
this, when it excused the warrant requirement for automobiles solely
because the mobility of the automobile and the amount of time
needed to obtain a warrant made it impracticable to obtain the war-
rant.
The late Justice Blaclunun sagely noted in his concurrence in
United States v. Leon that it may be necessary to revisit and reconsider
decisions by the Court in light of changing judicial understanding
about their effect in the real world of state and federal law enforce-
ment. 140 As has been shown in Part II, it is now apparent that the
Court's decisions modifying and extending the automobile exception
have distorted the automobile exception beyond its original purpose:
to permit an immediate warrantless search where it would be imprac-
ticable to secure a warrant. The Court's twists and turns have left an
exception that severely and illogically diminishes an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights merely because lie enters or places prop-
erty into an automobile. Real world experience with this contorted
rule teaches that it has become a tool of abuse which can be wielded
by government agents for all the wrong reasons. In an effort to pre-
serve the protections that are specifically contained within the Fourth
Amendment, it is time to set the automobile exception back on the
right track.
A. Recasting the Automobile Exception
It must be borne in mind that the automobile exception elimi-
nates only the need for a warrant; it does not remove the requirement
that probable cause must exist prior to the search. Therefore, elimi-
I" Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 358).
►4° See 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Bktcluntut, J., concurring).
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nating the warrant requirement only dispenses with the pre-search
review of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer. Because the war-
rant requirement is an important means of protecting Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the automobile exception should be limited to situations
in which it is truly impracticable to seek a warrant. Changing times,
technologies and circumstances have reduced the number of situa-
tions in which it is reasonable to contend that it is impracticable to
timely obtain a warrant. I, therefore, propose that the automobile ex-
ception to the warrant requirement be recast in order to preserve
both the warrant requirement and the attending judicial review of
probable cause whenever it would be practicable to do so.
First, recognizing that the individual rights affected by a search
and the rights affected by a brief seizure are not of equal weight, I
propose that when a law enforcement officer possesses probable cause
to believe an automobile contains contraband or fruits, evidence or
instrumentalities of criminal conduct, the officer should be permitted
to stop (seize) the vehicle for a reasonable period and conduct a tele-
phonic or facsimile search warrant that would require judicial review
of probable cause."' The law enforcement officer would be required
to act expeditiously in obtaining a warrant, as unreasonably pro-
longed seizures would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
scription against unreasonable seizures.
Assuming that the officer is acting expeditiously, it is undeniable
that even a brief seizure by the government is an intrusion upon the
protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. When compared
with the total and irrevocable destruction of one's privacy interests
occurring when an automobile is searched, however, the limited sei-
zure of the automobile is the lesser infringement. It is reasonable un-
der the Fourth Amendment to permit the lesser infringement–
temporary seizure–pending judicial review of the propriety of the
greater infringement—the search of the automobile." 2
Furthermore, an individual who is stopped and finds it too in-
convenient to await the issuance of a search warrant may consent to
the search of the automobile and thereby shorten the duration of the
seizure. This may give rise to claims that consents so obtained are not
voluntarily given. Such a practice may be overcome, however, by re-
141
 justice Harlan 's concurring and dissenting opinion in Chambers recognizes that the
seizure of an automobile—even for an entire day—while officers seek a search warrant will
almost always involve a lesser intrusion upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
that will an immediate warrantless search. See 399 U.S. at 63-64.
' 42 See United States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 796,798 (1984).
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quiring officers, before acting upon the consent, to advise the vehi-
cle's occupants that they have the right to refuse to consent to the
search of the automobile and, if they refuse to consent, that the
officers may search the car only if they obtain a search warrant from a
judicial officer.
There will, of course, be situations where an immediate search of
an automobile may be required by exigent circumstances. For exam-
ple, where there is a probable cause to believe that an automobile
contains an explosive device, an immediate search may be required in
order to preserve public safety. Similarly, if there is probable cause to
believe a kidnap victim is secreted in the trunk, an immediate search
is necessary to protect the victim. Additionally, if it is not possible to
secure the vehicle—as when there are insufficient officers to maintain
its security because the automobile has been stopped in a hostile envi-
ronment—an immediate search may be necessary because it may rap-
idly become impracticable to search later. Furthermore, other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement may justify an immediate search,
such as where there is probable cause to arrest the occupant of an
automobile, justifying an immediate Belton search. But, without facts
sufficient to justify an immediate search on other grounds, the auto-
mobile exception based upon the Carroll doctrine cannot justify an
immediate warrantless search.
B. Application of the Modified Rule
Consider how the modified rule would have been applied to the
facts in the Houghton case. The automobile in which Sandra Hough-
ton was a passenger was stopped because the driver was speeding and
the automobile had a faulty brake light. 143 One officer noticed a hy-
podermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket.' An officer asked the
driver why he had the syringe and, "with refreshing candor," the
driver replied that he uses it to take drugs." 5 At that point, the fact
that the driver possessed drug paraphernalia and admitted to using
drugs provided the officers with probable cause to search the auto-
mobile for drugs and drug paraphernalia.
In the actual case, the officers then ordered the two female pas-
sengers out of the automobile and asked them to identify themselves. 146
145 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1299 (1999).
144 See id.
145 See id.
198 See id. at 1299.
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They then retrieved a handbag, which Ms. Houghton identified as hers,
from the rear passenger seat area. They opened it, and removed her
wallet and driver's license. Upon discovering that the name upon the
license did not match the name petitioner had given, the officers con-
tinued the search of her purse. They removed a pouch and wallet-type
container and discovered drugs and drug paraphernalia inside. 147 The
Court held this to be a lawful search,'" building upon the Acevado deci-
sion, which permits officers to search the entire automobile and all
containers therein if they have probable cause to believe there is con-
traband anywhere in the vehicle. 149
Under the proposed revision to the Carroll automobile exception,
upon discovering the drug paraphernalia in the driver's pocket, the
police officers would have probable cause to briefly seize, but not to
search, the automobile and its occupants. The officers would have to
await issuance of an expeditiously obtained Search warrant. The po-
lice officers would not be permitted to search Ms. Houghton's hand-
bag on the theory, as articulated by the Court, that persons in the
company of drug users are more likely to have drugs concealed in
their possession. 150 Instead, the officers would be required to present
some particularized facts upon which a magistrate could find prob-
able cause to believe that her particular handbag contains drugs or
drug paraphernalia. These facts may or may not have been developed
in the actual case. What is preserved, however, is a procedure that the
Court has recognized as essential to the preservation of Fourth
Amendment protections: a review of probable cause by a neutral and
detached judicial officer.
In many jurisdictions, the fact that the driver possessed a hypo-
dermic syringe in his pocket would have given the officers probable
cause to arrest him. 151 At that point, the arrest power rule under Bel-
ton may provide officers with an additional justification to search Ms.
Houghton's handbag. If the container rule in Belton is modified to
permit only the brief seizure of the handbag when it is beyond the
"grab area" of the arrestee, 152 subject to the issuance of a telephonic
or electronic search warrant, Ms. Houghton's Fourth Amendment
147 See id.
14a See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.
145 See 500 U.S. at 580.
15° See Houghton, 119 S. Ct. at 1229.
151 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 836 (West 1999); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 851 (McKinney 1996).
152 See supra Part I.C.
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rights would again receive enhanced protection. Because her hand-
bag was in the rear seat area of the passenger compartment, it was be-
yond the grab area of the driver, who was outside the vehicle. A
modified Belton container rule would permit the officers to briefly
seize Ms. Houghton's handbag until a telephonic or electronic search
warrant issues. Alternatively, Ms. Houghton could consent to the
search after being advised of her right not to consent. Again, what is
gained is a neutral review of whether probable cause exists to justify a
search of a passenger's handbag. Thus, Ms. Houghton's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures
would not be curtailed merely because she stepped into an automo-
bile.
Where police officers are motivated to make a pretextual stop of
an automobile in order to take advantage of the diminished Fourth
Amendment protection for its occupants, this proposed change
should greatly reduce their incentive to do so. If a stop must be fol-
lowed by a showing of probable cause to a magistrate and the issuance
of a warrant to search, the type of abuse suffered by Mr. Wilkins, Mr.
Rodriguez and others should become much more rare. Some officers
may continue to make the stops in the hope of gaining consent, but if
valid consent requires the officer to advise the occupant of an auto-
mobile that the occupant need not consent and that a warrant to
search will be required absent that consent, the incentive to engage in
abusive stops would be greatly diminished. Officers who legitimately
have probable cause will find the search process lengthened by the
time it takes to obtain a telephonic or facsimile warrant, but this is no
more of a burden than other circumstances where the law requires a
warrant. To the extent that another exception—such as a true exi-
gency—would excuse obtaining a warrant, the search may proceed
without one.
CONCLUSION
The developments in the law of the automobile exception have
left a gaping hole in the rights protected under the Fourth Amend-
ment. The proposal contained in this article is an attempt to close
that hole and to restore the rights of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches in their automobiles, while still preserving le-
gitimate law enforcement interests. Further, by restoring the hide-
pendent judgment of a neutral and detached magistrate concerning
probable cause, rather than relying upon the police to police them-
selves, it is hoped and expected that there will be a reduction in the
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practice of actual and perceived abusive, pre textual and discriminato-
rily motivated searches of automobiles.
